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ABSTRACT

In the first six months of 1999 the Russian Federation government
instituted a wide range of policies related to fixing the Year 2000 Problem,
culminating in an attempt to pass a Y2K Law, a Presidential Decree, and other
governmental actions. Many systems are not expected to be fully remediated in
time.
Drawing extensively on Russian sources, this paper outlines the evolution
of government policies, gives an overview of the state of Y2K remediation as of
July 1999, and outlines the key provisions of the government’s policies. It is
concluded that the Russian government’s

largely administrative approach to

solving the Y2K problem is fairly ineffective and may lead to wider ranging
consequences for the economic system as a whole.
Keywords: Year 2000 problem, Y2K, Russia, Russian Federation, cost, risk,
remediation, government policy
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"In my opinion, the Y2K threat is understood by the
majority of managers at this level: 'Yeah maybe, somewhere,
something will happen. But dear God let it miss me. Hopefully it
will!' ... And if it doesn't miss us, we'll think up something. After all
if it doesn't miss me, it probably won't miss everyone else. To
drown together on the Titanic isn't so bad...." Vitaliy Fridlyand,
3Com Corp. [Algorithm Online, 1999].

I. INTRODUCTION
With just eight months left before January 1, 2000, the Russian
government published a “National Plan of Action for Resolving the ‘Year 2000'
Problem in the Russian Federation” [Government Commission, 1999a]. This plan
and a subsequent addition [Government Commission, 1999b], which includes
some target dates, outline a comprehensive set of measures to address the
problem. After a four-month delay, President Yeltsin signed a Presidential
Decree in June 1999 about “Unavoidable Measures for Solving the Year 2000
Problem” [Federal Commission, 1999j]. The Duma published a draft for a Year
2000 Law, which passed its second and third readings on June 24, 1999, was
approved by the Federation Council on July 2, 1999 [Federal Commission,
1999l], but was rejected by President Yeltsin on July 17, 1999 [Yeltsin, 1999b].
These plans and decrees come at a time when it appears that Russian
government departments are badly lagging. Y2K work began in earnest only after
a decree of the Kirienko government in May, 1998 [Russian Federation, 1998],
and many governmental agencies began serious work only around the beginning
of 1999. Experts such as Capers Jones assert that this kind of timetable would
leave far too little time to ensure that all critical systems are fully remediated, fully
tested, and tested in conjunction with other systems in time [Jones, 1998].
Estimates have been made that 30-50% of government systems will still contain
Y2K errors on January 1, 2000 [Servocomp, 1999]. As many as 3-4,000 pre1992 Soviet-era mainframe computers in Russia may have Y2K problems, many
in the military-industrial complex [McHenry, 1999]. As recently as March, 1999,
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the Gartner Group still ranked Russia with the least ready countries in the world,
in the category that 66% of companies in the country will suffer at least one
mission-critical failure, and there will be widespread, severe interruptions of
government service; widespread, moderate power loss/brownouts, telephone
and air transportation interruptions; and moderately distributed, severe
interruptions of imports and exports [Marcoccio, 1999]. Indeed, the National Plan
includes taking systems offline and replacing them with manual processing as
one of three serious options, along with replacing the systems outright or
modernizing them [Government Commission, 1999a].
How did the Russian Federation’s government allow itself to get into this
position? This paper examines the Russian government’s early response, the
magnitude of the problem, the state of remediation efforts, and policy initiatives
as of July 1999. It focuses specifically on the Russian government’s activities
because highly important areasthe military, nuclear power and energy,
telecommunications, and transportationare still under governmental control.
Studying the Y2K problem is interesting in its own right because of the potential
catastrophic consequences if certain systems are not remediated on time. But
since Y2K arose independently from any other social and political problems, it
can serve as an isolated “test case” to understand the capacity of the Russian
government, as it evolved, to make technology policy.

II. THE FIRST GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES

The first known Y2K activity occurred in April 1996, when the President’s
Committee of the Russian Federation on Policies of Informatization (later
absorbed into The State Committee on Communications and Informatization
(Goskomsvyaz’)), asked the Moscow “Integral” Scientific-Research Institute to
study the scale of the problem and to prepare a plan of corresponding measures.
At this time an inter-departmental conference was held, at which the attention of
leaders of ministries and departments was drawn to the Year 2000 problem
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[Bulgak, 1998]. This work apparently contributed to a presentation on the Year
2000 Problem in Fall 1997 to the Russian Federation Government prepared by
the Ministry of Science with the participation of the Federal Security Service
(FSB) and the Service of External Intelligence (SVR) [Bulgak, 1998]. A June,
1997 analysis of Goskomsvyaz’ focused on the so-called "power" (defense and
security-related) ministries, tax collection, customs, communications, transport,
and banking [Ministry of Transport, 1999a]. The main thrust of this work was
evaluating what security risks were posed by Y2K.
In January 1998, Vladimir Bulgak [1998], head of the Russian Federation
Government Commission for the Y2K Problem until June 1999, claimed that Y2K
work was going on in 32 executive organs, the Bank of Russia, and Sberbank
(the citizen’s savings bank). However, there was considerable skepticism about
Y2K. The theme of exploitation by the West cropped up time and time again,
both among computer professionals and government officials [McHenry, 1999].
Several officials, including Bulgak himself, expressed the opinion that the Y2K
problem may be exaggerated and may be used as a means for Western
companies to force upgrades and even technological dependence. (Bulgak
continued to express a similar opinion well into 1999 [Federal Commission,
1999d]). When it was suggested towards the end of 1998 that the Russian and
U.S. militaries should share early warning data and that the U.S. should help the
Russians prepare for Y2K, one faction in the Russian military believed this effort
to be nothing more than an attempt to infiltrate Russian systems [Felgenhauer,
1999]. Even in July 1999, Alexander Ivanov, the head of the State Committee for
Telecommunications (Goskomtelekom, which replaced Goskomsvyaz’ in June
1999), stated that in connection with the possible shipment of "a large quantity of
special and different computer technology" in October 1999 from the West, an
attempt of Western "special services" to enter computer systems and networks of
Russian governmental and defense-related ministries "is not excluded"
[Gazetta.ru, 1999]. Views like these and a widespread belief that Russia’s
computers were “too young” to have the Y2K problem resulted in little initial work
[McHenry, 1999] .
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It was not until Prime Minister Kirienko signed the “Order of the Russian
Federation Government of May 30, 1998 No. 671-r” that the way was opened for
intensive work on the Y2K problem. Goskomsvyaz’ was made the lead
governmental agency [Russian Federation, 1998]. Goskomsvyaz’ issued an
order in June 1998 which included plans to draw up an inventory of all computers
owned by federal and regional bodies to see to what extent they were vulnerable
to the problem. A training center was to be established and a testing and
certification system worked out. The cost of the program had yet to be
established but was estimated at between $100-$500 million. At this point
Goskomsvyaz’ was already saying the Y2K problem could not be fully resolved in
time. Typical guidelines were issued for making inventories. Working groups
were organized in many organizations at many levels to start addressing the
problem. Plans were expressed (but apparently never realized) to create a
public-private partnership called “Informatika 2000" [Afonina, 1998]. Some
evidence suggests that the high level attention given to Y2K at this time was
partly a result of Western conversations with Kirienko and Yeltsin, and of
activities of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia and other Western
firms [McHenry, 1999].
A very active period of Y2K work started at the beginning of 1999. On
January 21 a Governmental Commission on the Y2K Problem comprising highranking, important governmental officials was formed [Russian Federation, 1999].
At least one national conference was held (April 19-20, 1999). Goskomsvyaz’
regularly released press releases, making new estimates of the size of the
problem, and inaugurated a program to create a network of “centers of
competency” to provide advice and remediation services.

III. MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM

Several estimates have been made about the size of the Y2K problem in
Russia and how much it will cost to fix it. In probably what was one of the earlier
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estimates by the Gartner Group (when the price tag was still $300 billion
worldwide), Russia was said to need to spend $12.8 billion vs. $74.6 billion in the
US. Another estimate, by the Meta Group and Software Productivity Research,
asserted that Russia would need to spend $32 billion, or 7.3% of 1996 GDP, to
fix the Y2K problem. (The corresponding estimate by this group for the United
States was $188 billion, or 2.5% of GDP) [Mordkovich, 1998].
Four months after Goskomsvyaz’ head Alexander Krupnov proclaimed the
cost to be $500M, a plausible explanation of how this number was calculated
was advanced [Ministry of Transport, 1999b]. Because the government did not
collect systematic data about computer technology used at governmental
organizations, Goskomsvyaz’ decided to adjust easily available U.S. data to the
Russian situation using some coefficients. They started with information from the
U.S. Senate that U.S. federal government spending will reach $4.7B. This
amount was multiplied by three coefficients:
1. The infrastructure of informatization in the Russian government is
equal to 25% of the informatization infrastructure of the US federal
government.
2. Russian equipment is much more modern, yielding a savings of 30%.
3. Consolidation of efforts due to management by Goskomsvyaz’ and
large scale procurement provides another 40% savings.
The result according to Goskomsvyaz’ is equal (in billions): 4.7 * 0.25 * (1-0.3) *
(1-0.4) = 0.49. This is the $500M mentioned by Goskomsvyaz’ officials.
Krupnov later increased his estimate to $1.5-3B, which

“... [wa]s a

concrete calculation of expenditures based on data received from enterprises.
The variability of the numbers is impressivefrom $150 million for the Ministry of
Fuel and Energy to $125,000 for the Federal Border Service” [Y2K Problem,
1999]. It is possible again to break down the estimate using other published
estimates.
The hardware and systems software cost of replacing all the old
mainframes was said to be $400 million. Bulgak said that 15% of PCs needed to
be replaced in the government. Applying that ratio across the board and
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assuming about five million PCs in Russia, then 750,000 PCs would need to be
replaced [McHenry, 1999]. At a cost of $600 each, that would be about one-half
billion dollars. So it is possible that hardware replacement could cost $1B.
The aggregated data, published between February and June 1999, do not
particularly add up. Using a conversion rate of 24 rubles to the dollar, and adding
up estimates for transportation, telecommunications, energy, the Central Bank
and Sberbank, executive departments, the defense-related ministries, and a few
other ministries, the cost is as much as $834M. Goskomsvyaz’ has continued to
publicize $1-2B, although another more recent estimate from June 1999 says it
will be $471M [Federal Commission, 1999i]. In July 1999, the new head of the
State Committee on Telecommunications stated that $541M will be needed, of
which $83M has already been spent [Gazetta.ru, 1999].
If the cost really is $2B, it is a staggering percentage of the budget and
GDP. The total planned expenditures in the budget for 1999 were 575.46 billion
rubles, less than $25 billion dollars at the rate of 24 rubles to the dollar. Could
$2B be found when the overall budget is little more than ten times larger? Even
$1B, or 4% of the total budget, is a staggering amount.
In addition, the GDP of Russia in 1998 was 2684.5 billion rubles according
to official data, or $112B at the same rate of exchange. Fixing Y2K would cost
1.8% of GDP. Krupnov’s original high-end estimate was $3B, or 2.7% of GDP.
This estimate is almost the same as the percentage of GDP needed for the Y2K
problem for the US economy. Might the $2-3B estimate also be based on foreign
data? [Mordkovich, 1998].
These data are sufficiently murky as to leave considerable doubt about the
true need for remediation. At some points it was unclear whether the $1.5-3B
referred to the government or the economy as a whole. It is conceivable that the
highest estimates were made to attract foreign investment [Russia also
prepares,1999]. If this is the case, little was achieved. It is possible that the high
figures were all based on replacing entire systems rather than trying the longer
and possibly more arduous path of remediation. Clearly, resources for complete
replacement will not be found.
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IV. THE STATE OF AFFAIRS AS OF JULY 1999

It is impossible in a paper of this length to cover all areas of the Russian
economy. We start with an overview and then discuss some selected cases.

OVERVIEW
Readiness of Ministry of Defense systems was said to be 22% at the end
of February 1999 [Federal Commission, 1999a]. At the beginning of March, 1999,
Bulgak stated that "computer systems of all higher organs of power, the defensecomplex departments, and also key industrial and bank structures (The Russian
Energy System, The Gas Ministry, The Bank of Russia, Aeroflot) are only at 1012% readiness for solving the tasks that are arising" [Demos, 1999]. At the end of
March 1999, only three percent of ministries and departments had completed
remediation work

[Federal Commission, 1999d], although 80% had created

hardware and software inventories [Federal Commission, 1999e]. By April 14,
Bulgak asserted that governmental readiness had reached 30% [Federal
Commission, 1999g]. On the eve of the World Bank-sponsored Y2K conference
in April in Moscow, state organs were finishing their inventories and concluded
that about 30% of systems required priority correction or replacement.
During the first months of 1999 the government remained firm that the
large bulk of resources would have to be found by entities themselves. No funds
were allocated for 1999 Y2K work in the 1998 budget law. By March 1999 only a
few of 72 Russian ministries and departments had presented calculations to the
Ministry of Finance of needed Y2K resources [Federal Commission, 1999b], and
34 ministries and departments had not presented Y2K plans. Fifteen ministries
and departments were ultimately allowed to request State budget funding, but
only three had sent in their requests. Among those who had not were the KGBsuccessor Federal Security Bureau (FSB), the Federal Agency for Government
Communications and Information (FAPSI), the Ministry of Defense, and the
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Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) [Federal Commission, 1999c]. At the end of
May 1999, an extension was being arranged because these requests still had not
been made [Federal Commission, 1999i]. Among this group was the Ministry of
Emergency Situations (MChS), although it did approve a center of competency in
March 1999. Finally in July 1999 it was announced that the Ministry of Defense
will receive $20M, of which $10.7M had yet to be found. The Ministry of Internal
Affairs will be given $6M. The Finance Ministry prepared a draft of a law which
will reallocate "above plan" state budget income to the Y2K problem. This
Ministry also plans to open up a $50M line of credit for a large purchase of
computer equipment abroad, starting in October 1999 [Gazetta.ru, 1999].
In the industrial sector, by April 1999, 500 systems needing remediation
were discovered that involved dangerous, ecologically harmful, or continuous
production [Federal Commission, 1999h]. The most widely used domestic
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) package in Russia is TRACE
MODE from Ad Astra. Ad Astra asserted that many older controllers that may be
subject to the Y2K problem are still in use. Of about 3,000 installations of TRACE
MODE, 37% were in electricity, 17% in chemicals, and 12% in oil and gas. At the
end of February, a very small percentage of active TRACE MODE users had yet
carried out comprehensive testing of their systems [McHenry, 1999].
In July 1999, the Fuel and Energy Ministry (which does not include nuclear
energy) said it was 35% ready [“@” Daily, 1999]. In mid-July, readiness of the
government as a whole was still pegged at 30% [Gazetta.ru, 1999]. In materials
prepared in late July 1999 for a meeting of the Goskomtelekom, 152,200
computer systems were reported operating in Russian government ministries and
departments, of which 30,300 are considered "critical," i.e. their failure could lead
to "heavy consequences for the economic and social spheres" [Federal
Commission, 1999p]. Goskomtelekom itself is now said to have 26,115 computer
systems, of which 10,081 are considered critical. 8,551 require significant
modernization, and it is already planned that 76 systems will be shut down to
avoid possible dangerous situations. Six thousand systems perform functions
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related to air and space flight, of which 960 are considered critical. Only 360 of
these systems have yet been modernized [Federal Commission, 1999p].
In June 1999, Boris Pozin of the Russian systems integrator firm AyTi
claimed that only 7-8% of leaders of large state enterprises and commercial firms
had an idea of what the Year 2000 problem is, while other representatives of key
Russian systems integrators felt that information was much more widespread,
especially among lower level managers, and that work on remediation was
underway. Valeriy Elizov of Novell felt that, although serious work is going on,
little had changed since his November, 1998 Duma testimony. Organizations
have been able to best address internal problems of PCs and local area
networks. Few have been able to even address questions of interdependencies
with other organizations, let alone dependencies on the electric power, gas,
telecommunications, and other infrastructures [Algorithm Online, 1999].
LEGACY MAINFRAMES
In the Duma hearings of November 1998, testimony was given that the
USSR produced about 15,000 mainframes during the Unified System program.
This program lasted from about 1967 until 1991 and was primarily involved in
building functional duplicates of the IBM S/360 and S/370 series.1 Of these,
3,000 to 4,000 may still be running, despite the end of production in
approximately 1991. Many are probably in the military-industrial sector. Given
their relatively low processing power and the expense and difficulty of keeping
them running, they must be handling some important functions. The last new
release of an IBM-like operating system took place in 1987. The current chief
designer of the main institute that had oversight of this program testified that, "I
can reliably say that from a technical viewpoint starting from January 1, and
certain operating systems starting from the following January-March, etc. simply
will stop loading, if nothing is done with them" [Shmid, 1998]. Attempts were
made to organize assembly of IBM mainframes in Russia to provide a migration

1

See the following works for an overview of the achievements of the USSR in computing: [Davis
& Goodman, 1978; Goodman et al., 1988; Goodman & McHenry, 1991; McHenry, 1985; McHenry
& Goodman, 1986; Wolcott, 1993].
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path for these users, apparently to little avail. Some operating system
maintenance work continued at this institute, including the development in 1995
of emulator software allowing some tasks to be run under IBM's VSE/ESA
architecture. Nevertheless, most users would have to jump several generations
of technology to make use of new IBM mainframes, so even if it were possible to
buy replacements for them, time is running out to finish all of the rest of the
maintenance that would be needed [Mainframes in Russia, 1995]. Statements
that the software can be ported in a matter of days and weeks do not seem
realistic. In November 1998, Shmid was already recommending that enterprises
start making plans to simply turn off systems using these mainframes.
AIRLINE AND TRAIN RESERVATIONS
Since the breakup of the USSR, Aeroflot was divided into a number of
smaller and very small airlines. Plans to create a comprehensive, new airlines
reservation system for the whole country were put on hold and then scaled back
for lack of financing. It is now scheduled for completion in 2005. The existing
system, called Sirena-2 as a whole, actually consists of more than 50 different
versions. MS DOS PC-based terminal emulators which maintain compatibility
with earlier Sirena versions go by the names of their authors, such as the
Fedotov, Veytsman, and Zaytsev terminals. The system seems to be losing
participants and generally breaking down. No single body

is responsible for

oversight of this system as was the case in Soviet times. The chances that the
entire airlines reservation system will be working correctly after January 1, 2000
are slim. In February 1999 Aeroflot as a whole had only completed an inventory
of 63% of its systems and had not yet defined the necessary financing for
remediation [McHenry, 1999].
In contrast, the ministry responsible for train transportation (MPS)
managed to survive numerous governmental reorganizations. MPS got started
on remediating the reservation system, called Ekpress, in late 1997. By the time
of the Duma Y2K hearings in November 1998, most of the 800,000 lines of code
were reported checked and a windowing method applied. Testing was to be
completed by February 1999. Even in this case the situation was complicated
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because several separate organizations were in charge of various pieces of the
software. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, these organizations had
difficulty surviving, and lost many of their best programmers [McHenry, 1999].
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Of particular concern are the 29 reactors at nine nuclear power plants and
other reactors. The Ministry of the Atomic Energy Industry (Minatom) has
repeatedly asserted that primary control systems at the reactors are analogue
and will not be subject to the Y2K problem [Federal Commission, 1999m].
Nevertheless, many of these plants used Soviet 2nd and 3rd-generation
computers, some completely indigenous, which could present particular
remediation problems if legacy software or even some of the systems
themselves survived. It took programmers one month to get past a datedependent password at the Kalinin plant, for example [McHenry, 1999]. Recent
assessments by Westinghouse engineers who are working on upgrading the
control systems at the several of the Chernobyl’-like plants (RBMK-1000) and the
VVER-1000 plants are that the instrumentation and control (I&C) systems are
close to or at the end of their useful life and need to be replaced. Some of that
work is complete, but on-going upgrades could complicate Y2K efforts [McHenry,
1999]. The situation is considered serious enough that $1.5M was allocated
through the US-funded Center for Science and Technology to aid domestic
centers of competency and specific scientific groups to work on safety problems
for nuclear plants, hazardous materials, and other emergency situations. Funds
were first being distributed in May 1999 [International Science and Technology
Center, 1999]. The U.S. Department of Energy is funding the use of remediation
technology from Accelr8 Technology Corporation for nuclear plants in Lithuania,
Ukraine, and Russia. The first training seminars were held at the end of July
1999 [Acclr8 Technology Corporation, 1999].
The Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant (LAES) posted to the web a
preliminary inventory and analysis of computer technology subject to the Y2K
problem. It uses PCs by Western firms such as HP, Compaq and IBM that are
verified by the vendors, and pre-1996 PCs and Russian-assembled PCs that
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must be checked individually (e.g. PCs from Acer purchased in 1995 [McHenry,
1999]]. Patches for common Microsoft software, Novell Netware 3.11 and 3.12,
and HP-UX are easily accessible. These lower level tests are considered easy,
but "there are difficulties with verifying information technology at the higher
levels... The reason in our viewthe significant labor intensity of verification....
Specialists must be assigned to organize this work or outside organizations must
be hired. It does not appear to be possible to carry out this work, at a sufficient
level, on the fly" [Garusov, 1999]. This report is dated 1999, but says that a more
detailed inventory is still needed.
In addition, the report states that some older Soviet computers and
microprocessors are still in use: the SM-1210; the 8080- and 8086-like
microprocessors 580VM80, 1816VE31, 1810VM86, 1810VM87; and the V3-M.
We know nothing about the latter, but suspect it may be related to an indigenous
line of computers developed by the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of
Electromechanics (VNIIEM). The SM-1210 follows the line of HP minicomputers
and probably went out of production about 1992. Some assembly language and
Fortran routines are used on this machine. These computers show up in the
section on systems for management of the reactors, probably for collection and
processing of data, although use of acronyms in the report makes it difficult to
know exactly what they do. A vibration monitoring system for the first and second
reactors uses a 486DX4 computer. Other older software in use includes OS/2,
Microsoft Fortran 77 V. 5, Borland C V. 4 and C++ V. 3.1, Clipper 5.2, and
dBase. Obviously not all applications based on these machines are critical or
have date dependencies, but most need to be checked and then remediation
needs to be completed. The report makes no mention of work presumably being
done by Westinghouse and its internal Russian partners to help upgrade the I&C
systems at the plant [McHenry, 1999]. No one seems to think that the nuclear
plants are in danger of exploding, but it is possible that, in the presence of other
unforeseen conditions, Y2K problems could contribute to potential disasters.
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SOFTWARE PIRACY
Another particularly daunting problem is software piracy for PC-based
business software, which reached 92% in 1998 with a replacement cost of
$273M [International Planning and Research Corporation, 1999]. Consider just
the situation of Novell. Novell said in its November 1998 Duma testimony that 8090% of all the information systems in Russia are based on one or another
version of Novell Netware. They estimated 10-12,000 (government) servers
running mostly Versions 3.11 or 3.12 of Netware, which are not compliant. The
long-available patch is only available to legal users. From 300,000 to 500,000
state workers use Novell products, and from 30 to 80% of the users are not
registered. Some of the worst offenders are the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry
of Interior Affairs (responsible for enforcing the anti-piracy law), Minatom, the
energy complex, and the tax organs. The logistics of shipping new versions of
Netware, making the upgrades, adjusting other software, training users,
upgrading hardware if necessary, and testing the whole system by January 1,
2000 are now becoming quite daunting. Novell does have some patches that do
not require changing versions, but only for certain versions [McHenry, 1999].
One solution being pursued is to ask Western software firms to provide
large discounts or even give away their new version. Some firms have refused,
while others agreed [McHenry, 1999]. Pirated copies of upgraded versions may
presumably be obtained, but users must be informed that the upgrade is
necessary and then must find a suitable upgrade path that works in their
environments. The centers of competency are probably engaged in certifying
many more versions of software than might need to be done in the West,
especially since beta versions may be distributed by software pirates along side
“real” versions [Kolesov, 1997].
OUTSIDE MOSCOW
Characterizing the state of remediation in specific regions away from
Moscow is difficult, but there is enough evidence to suggest that a number of
regional governments got off to a very late start. Russia is divided into 88
administrative regions, known as oblasts, krays, republics, and okrugs.
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Goskomsvyaz’ itself said that “the regions” had done virtually nothing as of
January 1999 [McHenry, 1999].
At the end of July 1999 the city of Moscow is estimated to need no less
than $40 million to replace or modernize about half of its computers [Federal
Commission, 1999o]. Although Moscow dominates computer usage, PCs may be
found throughout the country. Consider, for example, Siberia and the Far East.
One analysis of the demand for PCs in 1996 stated that sales in these areas
would make up 25.8% of the approximately 1.3M PCs sold that year [McHenry,
1999]. In Novosibirsk, planning began rather early. A decree was issued in
August 1998 in response to the Kirienko decree, and inventories were to be
completed by the end of 1998. However, the government did not offer financing
and testing was not scheduled until the fourth quarter, 1999 [In Novosibirsk,
1999; McHenry, 1999]. Six centers of competency were certified between March
and May 1999. All banks were said to be working on it and would present official
assurances of readiness by September 1, 1999 [Federal Commission, 1999k]. In
the Altay Kray, two centers were certified by the regional government in March,
1999, and a two-week seminar for all administrative levels was being held at the
beginning of April 1999 [Federal Commission, 1999f].

In

Irkutsk, an

“informatization week” was planned in February 1999 which included information
about the Y2K problem [McHenry, 1999]. In Khabarovsk, two centers of
competency were certified in March and one in June 1999, all affiliates of
national systems integrator firms. The local Komp'yulink affiliate, although not a
center, started offering BIOS and operating system services, but nothing for
applications software, in February 1999 [Popov, 1999]. One center of
competency was certified in Vladivostok in April 1999. In all, 24 centers of
competency so far are certified by regional governments outside Moscow [State
Committee on Communications and Informatization, 1999].
As another example, the St. Petersburg government ignored pleas to
begin Y2K work until the May 1998 Kirienko decree. Between October and
December 1998, seminars by Western firms helped raise awareness, and an
unpaid Working Group on the Y2K Problem was formed under the mayor’s office.
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Eventually, in March 1999 a resolution was passed banning the sale of noncompliant hardware and software, and the city government allocated all of
R300,000 ($12,500) to address the Y2K problem [A&G, 1999]. In June 1999 a
partnership with Computerland/St. Petersburg was announced under which the
firm would carry out a comprehensive audit of governmental computers in the
Leningrad

oblast,

taking

care

of

their

"modernization."

Members

of

Computerland/St. Petersburg will sit on the Y2K commission of Leningrad oblast
[Ambar’ Corp., 1999].
When McHenry visited St. Petersburg in December 1998, he found the
following situation:
•

The St. Petersburg city waterworks had only begun to evaluate the scope
of the problem, although it asserted that the actual delivery of water did
not depend on digitally controlled systems.

•

The city electric utility (Lenenergo) had formed a working group and was
also evaluating systems, claiming that, while there may be problems with
billing, electricity will not be interrupted due to Y2K.

•

The city organization in charge of data processing for social services was
just getting started, and was confident that its own programmers could
handle whatever challenges were presented by Y2K because of prior
experience with other maintenance tasks.

•

The computer center for the Northwest Railroad was actively seeking
funds to replace about 1,000 PCs subject to Y2K problems. When asked
what would happen if these systems are not replaced, a high ranking
member of the staff stated: “Basically I do not believe [that this will
happen]. We in Russia always somehow manage clenching our teeth,
storing extra air in our lungs [to get out of the situation]. But if the situation
would be like today, say in two weeks it would be Y2K, everything would
stop, I guarantee you that” [McHenry, 1999].

As expressed in the epigraph to this paper, there seems to be a cultural
predisposition (known as avos’ in Russian) to rely on hope and fate, to think “our
boys” we be able to pull off whatever needs to be done, to wait and see what
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happens, and to not create contingency plans. Another frequently cited proverb
in conjunction with the Y2K problem is: “Until the thunder peals, the peasant
does not make the sign of the cross.” This was cited frequently during the St.
Petersburg visit. The only organization at this time that seemed to have made
substantial progress was in charge of front-office post office systems, where the
level of automation was often moving data on a floppy disk, if that.

V. EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POLICY INITIATIVES

Executive approaches to the Y2K problem consisted of
•

designating Goskomsvyaz’ as lead organization,

•

the publication of guidelines,

•

the certification of centers of competency, and two recent additions:

•

the publication of the National Plan to address the Y2K problem, and

•

the Decree signed by Boris Yeltsin.

Legislative approaches included holding hearings and trying to pass a Y2K Law.
THE CENTERS OF COMPETENCY
One of the chief means used by the Russian government to address the
Y2K problem is certifying so-called “centers of competency.” As reported on June
11, 1999, about 162 centers had been certified, mainly by Goskomsvyaz’ or
oblast administrations. The most common service provided by the centers was
providing information for dealing with hardware and systems software questions
for Intel-based PCs and servers. About 23% of the centers provided support for
mainframes, including older Soviet-era models. About 65% could handle network
questions, and about 30% offered specialized services, sometimes specific to the
type of software in a specific branch. As Table 1 demonstrates, certification
began rather late, and peaked in March and April 1999. Private organizations
dominate, comprising about two-thirds of those certified. More certifications will
undoubtedly be made, and other organizations may also provide Y2K consulting,
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although they have been called lacking in experience and necessary equipment
[State Committee on Telecommunications, 1999].

Table 1. Certification of Y2K Centers of Competency by Month and Type
reported as of June 11, 1999 [State Committee on Communications and Informatization,
1999]

State
Academia
Private

Dec-98 Jan-99 Feb-99 Mar-99 Apr-99 May-99
0
9
7
14
11
3
0
0
1
1
3
3
3
7
11
34
24
19

Jun-99
3
1
8

Total
47
9
106

The greatest concentration of centers, 41%, was in the Moscow
area, with 9% in St. Petersburg. Even by June 1999, only 51% (45) of the
administrative regions in Russia had at least one certified center. Only nine
regions, including Moscow, had more than three centers. Twenty-five regions
had only one center. As Table 2 illustrates, the rate at which regions were added
was rather slow, and about half of the regions represented did not get their
center(s) certified until April, just 8-9 months before the deadline and well into the
period when Y2K problems were already manifesting themselves.

Table 2. Number of New Regions Adding Center(s) of Competency by Month
Reported as of June 11, 1999
[State Committee on Communications and Informatization, 1999]

Type
Kray
Oblast
Okrug
Republic
TOTAL

Dec-98
0
1
0
0
1

Jan-99 Feb-99 Mar-99
0
4
0
1
5

1
2
0
1
4

2
10
0
1
13

Apr-99
1
5
1
1
8

May-99 Jun-99
0
5
0
5
10
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1
2
0
1
4

TOTAL
5
29
1
10
45

Percentage of
ALL of this type
83%
58%
10%
45%
51%
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One reason that these centers emerged rather slowly is that the original
decree stated that they would have to be paid by their clients. Russian clients
are not used to paying for consulting services, and have few funds to do so. Most
want to rely on their own forces, not only because of cost but because they are
considered to be far more trustworthy. Russian software firms themselves were
seduced by the idea that, because of the relatively young age of most Russian
computers, the problem would not be large. Another reason cited was the
absence of qualified people, although Russian programmers were hired to do
remediation work for Western firms. Apparently 20 invitations to foreign firms
were sent to foreign computer firms working in Russia to set up centers of
competency. Half refused outright. Novell, IBM, and Microsoft agreed, but have
not yet done so officially [McHenry, 1999].
THE NATIONAL PLAN
At the end of March 1999 a “National Plan of Actions for Solving the Year
2000 Problem in the Russian Federation” was published by the Government
Commission on Solving the Year 2000 Problem [1999a]. The nine areas of the
plan cover
1. Y2K publicity,
2. cooperation with international bodies,
3. getting critical systems ready,
4. creating the proper legal and normative bases,
5. creating the needed organizational infrastructure,
6. creating methodological materials,
7. creating the technical infrastructure,
8. creating mechanisms for outside control of the readiness of critical
systems, and
9. preparing contingency plans.
A supplement to the National Plan was published in May 1999 [Government
Commission, 1999b], which is organized by these nine areas, listing similar
tasks, and attaching time frames and responsible organizations. Some time
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frames, however, are quite vague, e.g. January-December 1999, or have already
passed.
Parts of the plan that have already been done suggest it was created and
followed in principle before it was approved.2 For example, it calls for “increasing
the completion of the full creation of inventories and classifications of systems...
and creating... plans which are broken down by basic life-important systems” (to
be finished by April 1999) The list of especially critical systems must be made
more precise (April-May 1999). It also says work on defining needed
expenditures must continue, although without defining how allocated funds in the
budget will be reallocated (to be done by May 1999). Trying to arrange for
discounts for volume purchases of hardware and software was to be done in
May-June 1999.
The plan says that pragmatism must be at the root of Y2K decisionmaking, eschewing ambitious plans that may come to fruition only with fortuitous
circumstances. Its essence is taking existing personnel and redirecting their
attention to solving this problem by creating all the necessary bureaucratic
mechanisms to do so. It envisions:
•

Setting up a system for collecting and processing data about the course of
Y2K remediation in federal ministries and departments and other regional
governmental units (to be collected monthly by Goskomsvyaz’ and in the
2nd, 3rd, and 4th quarters of 1999 by the State Statistics Committee);

•

setting up a system of certification for foreign and domestic hardware and
software (March-May 1999);

•

creating inter-branch and regional commissions to look after work in
related branches and across regions (April-June 1999). In particular the
supplemental plan contains a long list of departments and ministries that
are to form cross-branch groups in May 1999;

•

formation of oversight and control structures in staffs and working groups
for verifying Y2K readiness of critical systems (March-May 1999);

•
2

continuing the development of the system of centers of competency

It was first expected at the end of February 1999.
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(March-May 1999);
•

the widespread creation of contingency plans (June 1999), and typical
scenarios (August 1999);

•

verifications of readiness of computer systems at all levels of the
government, ministries and departments (July-October 1999);

•

analysis and evaluation of these tests and ordering of additional work if
needed (August-November 1999);

•

and taking final decisions about what to do for avoiding catastrophes
(September-December 1999).
Setting aside the fact that many of these measures are encountering

delays, all of these national structures can only go so far when it comes to
specific applications software. A spreadsheet or database program may be
certified as Y2K compliant, but that does not prevent an organization from using
two-digit dates in certain columns or creating a database interface with space for
just two digits. The most difficult problem seems to be to compel organizations to
actually do the needed work, requiring that the bureaucratic machines in
ministries and departments create all the necessary orders and documents to get
work going at all levels. The creation of these instructions is envisioned for MaySeptember 1999. Ultimately this problem necessitated both a Presidential
Decree and a Y2K Law.
THE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
The National Plan calls for the creation of a Presidential Decree on Y2K.
Expected at the end of March [Federal Commission, 1999d], it was finally signed
on June 17, 1999. The Presidential Decree directs that “personal supervision
[kontrol’]” be established for enacting and realizing Y2K measures at all levels of
the government, in local governments, in state organizations (“fundy”) not
financed by the government, in stock companies in which the government has
shares, and in “other organizations.” The Decree recommends that all key high
governmental institutions such as the Duma and the Constitutional Court take
necessary measures. It recommends taking measures in the banking sphere “all
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the way to considering the question of revoking licenses” for banks that cannot
show compliance. Measures are to be taken to ensure Russia fulfills its
international obligations, and to prevent hardware and software from being
brought into Russia that is not Y2K compliant. A report is to be given to the
president in November 1999 about the state of affairs [Yeltsin, 1999a], a draft of
which is to be ready by October 15, 1999 [Federal Commission, 1999n].
The National Plan’s vision of a presidential decree and the decree
ultimately signed by Boris Yeltsin differ in two main respects. First, the National
Plan asks for a decree that gives the Presidential Commission (author of the
Plan) the chief role as coordinator of all Y2K work throughout the
governmenthowever, this commission is never mentioned in the Decree! Of
course, such powers were already granted the Commission in the order forming
it in January 1999 [Russian Federation, 1999]. Second, the National Plan calls
for assigning “personal responsibility [otvetstvennost’]” whereas Yeltsin only
decreed personal supervision. At least as early as February, 1999, Bulgak said
that heads of major ministries, the Central Bank, and other agencies are “to take
under personal responsibility the management” of Y2K efforts [Russian Business
Consulting, 1999]. Bulgak apparently issued an order, which may or may not be
enforced, requiring managers of basic departments and the largest Russian
companies to personally monitor the safe operation of their computer systems
during the 2000 rollover [NTV, 1999]. Plans for the Decree, discussed at the end
of March, also say it will include “personal responsibility” [Federal Commission,
1999d]. The Decree may therefore represent a backing away from attempts to
impose personal responsibility on top officials. Given that it appears to be
watered down, one wonders why it was ultimately needed, beyond the fact that it
does do a few things that the Y2K law does not.
THE Y2K LAW
A Y2K law was first introduced at the end of March 1999, passed the first
reading on June 4, 1999, was amended with comments from the government and
individuals, including an Internet-based conference on it, and passed the second
and final (third) reading on June 23, 1999. On July 2 the law was approved by
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the Federation Council, and was expected to be signed soon thereafter by
President Yeltsin [Federal Commission, 1999l]. The key provisions were:
•

federal, regional, local agencies and those responsible for computer
systems elsewhere are “obliged” [obyazan] to take the “necessary
measures” to forestall negative consequences from Y2K;

•

users whose rights and legal interests may be damaged must be informed
of possible Y2K problems, and if those interests may be damaged, the
government must be informed and crisis plans must be created and
enacted; federal level bodies responsible for crisis must be informed if the
Y2K problem could lead to dangerous or emergency situations;

•

users may demand that providers present documentation about Y2K
readiness;

•

financing is to be done by owners themselves, but governments may also
define financing within their scope of activity;

•

computer system owners must present certification or a declaration of Y2K
readiness, and systems without one of these may not be used by
governmental bodies or used if the system impinges upon the rights and
legal interests of citizens, legal persons, or the state; the government may
define a list of these systems; declarations may be issued by the owners
of the systems themselves and must be registered according to the law on
certification of products and services;

•

penalties are assigned in accordance with existing laws;

•

the Y2K problem may not be seen as an “Act of God.”
The final version of the law differed considerably from the original draft.

The latter included a whole range of penalties, including up to three years in
prison for carelessness leading to heavy consequences. These provisions were
deleted, according to a participant in the process, because penalties were
already covered by other laws [Barkin, 1999]. Provisions that banned producing
or importing non-compliant hardware and software were deleted, as were tax and
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tariff breaks for Y2K products and services. The scope of the act was broadened
to include any computer system that could influence rights and legal interests of
others. Making the law less definite left even more on the shoulders of the
government, which was charged with creating the necessary additional
documents and administering the law. According to the participant, most of the
documents were ready [Barkin, 1999].
In late July 1999, this law was rejected by President Yeltsin. Yeltsin stated
that the law took on responsibilities of the government, which violated principles
of separation of powers. Y2K policy is already defined in two decrees [Russian
Federation,1998 and Russian Federation, 1999]. It also allegedly included
imprecise and vague definitions and provisions [Yeltsin, 1999b].
The absence of this legal framework reduced, if not crippled, motivation
for carrying out Y2K work. Under the law, organizations would have been obliged
to remediate, and a climate for sharing necessary information would have been
created. In our view, the published governmental policies do not go as far as the
law would have gone, and its rejection by Yeltsin leaves many unanswered
questions.
MORE CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT POLICY
As this paper was being completed, the actors continue to change,
although the administrative approach remains central. As noted in Section II,
Goskomsvyaz’ was replaced by Goskomtelekom and its head Krupnov is gone.
The new Vice Premier of Russian Federation, Il’ya Klebanov, says that the Y2K
problem will be solved by November 1999 and that “nothing terrible” will happen
in Russia. Several commissions will be created to control the measures being
taken to solve it [Federal Commission, 1999k]. These commissions may simply
be continuations of those envisioned in the National Plan. In August 1999 all
executive departments will be required to use a mandatory single form for
reporting Y2K progress. Klebanov promised to carry out selected verification of
Y2K readiness at strategically important economic entities, requiring them to
prepare reports to the government [NTV, 1999]. He himself is obliged to report
about Y2K readiness on a weekly basis to the head of the cabinet of ministers.
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First Deputy Premier Khristenko, Minister of Finance Kas'yanov, and Minister of
the Economy Shaloval'yanets are tasked with finding finances for Y2K repairs
[Gazetta.ru, 1999]. FAPSI will now become involved in testing local
telecommunications systems, which should raise the profile of remediation work
considerably. In what is apparently a new order, issued by Goskomtelekom, the
language of personal responsibility returned. Priority systems for remediation
must be defined by August 15, 1999 [Federal Commission, 1999n]. The tenor
and

provisions

of

this

order

suggest

that

the

State

Committee

on

Telecommunications is repeating orders that were given six months earlier,
implying that a number of departments did in fact do little during this time period.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The evidence presented in this paper shows that the Russian
government’s response to the Y2K problem was indeed quite late. Every
indication is that many systems will not be fully remediated and tested by the
deadline of January 1, 2000. The intention to import $50 million of hardware in
October 1999 is particularly worrisome [Gazetta.ru, 1999]. Three questions
remain: has the response been too little, why did this happen, and what may the
broader consequences be?
It is often claimed that Russia is less dependent on computers than the
developed Western nations, and this is certainly true. The number of systems is
fewer, and numerous old systems that were not needed or too expensive to run
were simply turned off after the USSR was broken up [McHenry, 1999]. Those
that survived and those that have been created recently, it may be argued, are
there

because

they

are

really

needed.

Critical

services,

such

as

telecommunications, electricity, oil and gas, banking, and transportation all
depend on computers, not to mention defense, intelligence, tax collection,
elections, and a host of other governmental services. Their failure may cause
some significant problems which in some cases may have noticeable economic
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effects within Russia and repercussions abroad. The fact that Klebanov must
now report on a weekly basis shows the level of governmental concern about
these systems.
However, over the past few years Russia entered a state of almost
permanent turmoil and economic disruption. GDP declined about 5% from 1997
to 1998, and economic upheaval ensued from the crash of the ruble in August
1998. Many employees have not received salaries for months and sometimes
even years, debts between enterprises are extremely high, and it is expected that
at least one quarter of Russian banks, including the largest from the top ten list
may disappear within one year. It is asserted that the Russian military system is
declining and is not providing reliable defense (in particular, satellite monitoring)
due to the loss of many locations after the breakup of the USSR and the financial
problems over the last 10 years. Four Prime Ministers have occupied the
Russian White House since the U.S. Presidential Commission on Y2K started
working.
In this economic and political context, it is understandable that investing in
Y2K solutions could not be a very high priority. Fixing a bank’s computers, for
example, does not make sense when the bank itself may fall due to the economic
crisis. In this sense it is possible that the "campaign" approach taken by the
Russian government to focus higher and higher levels of attention on the
problem as the deadline approaches may result in avoiding catastrophes, and so
Russia will join the ranks of other countries that are saying that “nothing terrible
will happen.” This approach may work in somewhat rough proportion to the risks
involved.
Of three possible approaches–legal, economic, and administrative–it is
again understandable why the Russian government chose the third. The legal
system in Russia is underdeveloped and commands little respect as a motivator
for action. Passing Y2K legislation in developed countries with long-standing and
uninterrupted legal traditions is contentious enough. In discussions about the
proposed Y2K law (see www.algo.ru/law2000), participants raised the question of
whether or not the purpose of the law was mainly to get the attention of
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managers, or was it to be a “real” law that would be enforced. How could a
manager given no resources to solve the Y2K problem be held responsible for
solving it? The legal system provided little, if any, motivation for working on the
Y2K problem.
The Y2K law also envisioned economic incentives to spur Y2K work in the
form of eliminating tariffs for importing new hardware and software and tax
breaks. However, the government could hardly afford to give up any revenue.
The government did try to encourage the creation of a market of Y2K services.
Towards the end of 1998 very few private firms were getting into Y2K
remediation at all. By offering the preferred status as a “center” and directing that
certain governmental systems be certified, the government was trying to supply
incentives for work to be done. Indeed, although they emerged slowly and are
not located everywhere, these centers are probably the government’s best
achievement, since they are increasing the distribution of know-how, supplying
software tools to test systems, and helping organizations create contingency
plans. Issuing methodological materials, doing testing only once, etc.
undoubtedly avoided much duplication of work. However, the effectiveness of
this system was clearly diminished by rejecting Y2K law, which encouraged
certification on a much broader scale.
The main thrust of the Russian governmental approach is administrative,
not unlike a typical centralized campaign seen in Soviet times. An author for NTV
recently saw this as an advantage, claiming: "...in spite of the wary opinions in
the West, Russia fully realizes the seriousness of the Y2K problem and is ready
to see it through to a successful conclusion. What's more, our country, wellknown for the irrepressible bureaucratic ardor of the still present old Soviet mold,
in some ways is even ahead of the whole planet in the solution of the Y2K
problem" [NTV, 1999]. Unfortunately, even in Soviet times large scale campaigns
could only go so far to solve economic and social problems. By their very nature,
resources could only be concentrated on part of the problem. This is one of the
reasons that widespread computerization failed to take hold in the 1970s and
1980s [McHenry, 1985]. Now, the motivators behind those campaigns of
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resources and Communist Party discipline for individual managers are absent.
Although numerous pronouncements were made about personal responsibility,
the Yeltsin decree seemed to have weakened it. Once again, without resources,
how can there be responsibility? It is therefore not at all surprising that the
campaign approach is not working particularly well. Fixing the Y2K problem
required early awareness and a sustained effort over many months for the
systematic investigation of all systems and their internal and external
dependencies, their repair, and their testing. Many systems may remain unfixed
as January 2000 arrives.
Besides needing to clean up breakdowns that may occur due to Y2K
problems, two more lasting impacts of Y2K need to be considered. The first is
what Russia ends up with after all this work is performed. In Western countries it
seems that in many cases, there will be a silver lining associated with the Y2K
efforts: firms invested in newer hardware or software, improved the management
practices in the I/S function, and upgraded entire systems, in some cases adding
functionality [Kappleman, 1999]. New organizations were created that cut across
traditional boundaries and may lead to more effective inter-sector and
international contingency planning in the future. Russia will only get yet another
set of “workarounds” that prolong the life of already obsolete systems. On the
surface the result will be the same–no particularly huge catastrophes, we hope–
but the Western method may create more wealth in the future while the Russian
method may diminish it.
The second impact has to do with the government on a broader level. By
resorting to administrative mechanisms, the government continues to be reactive,
putting out the largest fires at the last minute. This approach is the
institutionalization of “too little, too late.” Rather than stemming from ignorance,
inattention, incompetence, or disbelief, the government’s failure with Y2K may
stem from its inability to act decisively and effectively within the governmental
system that now exists in Russia. It is beyond the scope of this paper to argue
whether or not this outcome represents the psychological reactions of the older
generation of managers or whether it is an inherent flaw in the structure of the
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Russian government as it evolved. If the latter, then the most lasting impact of
the Y2K problem may have little to do with computers per se, but may serve as
an example of much broader failures in economic policy which still lay ahead.
Editor’s note: This article was received on July 30, 1999 and was published on August 8, 1999.
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APPENDIX
CHRONOLOGY OF SELECTED KEY EVENTS
1996 April
1997 June 10
September
1998 January 20
May 30

June 26
November 12

November 19
November 24
1999 January 22
March 26
End of March

Moscow "Integral" Scientific Research Institute tasked to study possible
Y2K problems
Goskomsvyaz' Order RF 10.06.97 No. 78 finances "Integral" work
Russian Federation Government hears presentations by Ministry of
Science
Bulgak makes one of the first public statements about Y2K work in the
government
Russian Federation Government Order of May 30, 1998 No. 671-r signed
by Prime Minister Kirienko opens way for intensive Y2K work, making
Goskomsvyaz' responsible
Goskomsvyaz' Order No. 107 "About the Organization of Work on Solving
the Y2K Problem" includes guidelines for addressing the problem
Yeltsin signs Order about Realization of Decisions of Birmingham G-7
meeting, including a paragraph instructing Goskomsvyaz' to report in two
months on involving Russia in international Y2K measures
Goskomsvyaz' approves two documents about Centers of Competence
Russian Parliament (Duma) Hearings about Y2K
Russian Federation Order No. 100-r creating Governmental Commission
on Y2K signed by Prime Minister Primakov
Governmental Commission on Y2K issues National Plan of Action for
Resolving Y2K Problem
Y2K Law introduced into Parliament
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May 18
June
June 4
June 17
June 23
July 2
July 17
July

Governmental Commission on Y2K issues additional measures relating to
the National Plan
Goskomsvyaz' reorganized into Goskomtelekom, Klebanov replaces
Bulgak
Y2K Law passed first reading
Yeltsin signs Decree on Y2K
Y2K Law passed second and third readings
Y2K Law approved by upper chamber of Parliament
Yeltsin refuses to sign Y2K Law passed by Parliament
Goskomtelekom order requiring priority systems be defined by August 15,
1999

ACRONYMS
FAPSI
FSB
Goskomsvyaz’
Goskomtelekom
Lenenergo
MChS
Minatom
Minfin RF
MNTTs
MVD
NTV
Rosenergoatom
Sberbank
SCADA
SVR
VNIIEM
Y2K

The Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information
The Russian Federation Federal Security Bureau
The Russian Federation State Committee on Communications and
Informatization
The Russian Federation State Committee for Telecommunications
Leningrad Oblast Energy Administration
The Russian Federation Ministry of Emergency Situations
The Russian Federation Ministry of the Atomic Energy Industry
The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance
International Science and Technology Center
The Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs
Nezavisimoe (Independent) Television
State Enterprise "Concern Rosenergoatom" (oversees 8 of 9 Nuclear Plants in
Russia)
Russian Federation Citizen’s Savings Bank
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
The Russian Federation Service of External Intelligence
All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Electromechanics
The Year 2000
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